Commentary: Authority of the Commissioner Over the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences by Moy, R. Carl
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship
1994
Commentary: Authority of the Commissioner
Over the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
R. Carl Moy
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, carl.moy@mitchellhamline.edu
Publication Information
76 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 391 (1994)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
Repository Citation
Moy, R. Carl, "Commentary: Authority of the Commissioner Over the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences" (1994). Faculty
Scholarship. Paper 156.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/156
Commentary: Authority of the Commissioner Over the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences
Abstract
On August 3, 1992, the United States Patent and Trademark Office published a notice in the Federal Register
requesting public comments on the PTO's appeal procedures. Taken in context, then, the notice can be fairly
said to raise the issue whether, under the existing statute, the Board is subservient to the Commissioner. It also
raises the broader question of whether such a subservient arrangement is desirable or, alternatively, whether
the statute should be modified if necessary to give the Board decisional independence from the
Commissioner. This Commentary is directed primarily to this latter point. In summary, it concludes that the
Commissioner, and not the Board, is inherently better suited to determine policy in the patent area. Whatever
administrative lawmaking authority exists in the patent area should therefore reside in the Commissioner.
Given this conclusion, there is little or nothing to gain from placing the adjudicatory powers of the Board
outside the Commissioner's supervision. Indeed, such a change would likely have negative effects. The most
appropriate course is therefore to continue the Board's present subservience to the Commissioner.
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Commentary: Authority of the 
Commissioner Over The Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences 
R. Carl Moyl 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 3, 1992, the United States Patent and Trademark Office published a notice in the Federal Register requesting public com-
ments on the PTO's appeal procedures.2 The subject matter of the 
notice is closely related to the controversy surrounding the Commis-
sioner's handling of the appeals in Ex parte Alappat3 and Ex parte 
Akamatsu. 4 As has been described in the trade press,5 in each of these 
cases the Commissioner appears to have actively intervened in the 
appeals process. In each, a panel of the Board of patent Appeals and 
Interferences (hereinafter the "Board") apparently was convened ini-
tially, without the Commissioner, to decide the appeal. Upon learning 
of the decision of the original panel, the Commissioner apparently 
constituted a new panel that included himself and imposed a different 
decision.6 / 
Taken in context, then, the notice can be fairly said to raise the 
issue whether, under the existing statute, the Board is subservient to 
the Commissioner. It also raises the broader question of whether such 
a subservient arrangement is desirable or, alternatively, whether the 
1 Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Of Counsel, Faegre & Benson, Min-
neapolis, Minnesota. 
2 Notice of Request for Public Comments; Review of PTO Appeal Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg. 
34123. 
3 No. 91-1277 (Apr. 22, 1992). 
4 No. 91-3230 (Mar. 20, 1992). 
5 E.g., Correspondence Between Board Members and PTO Commissioner on Board Indepen-
dence, 44 PTCJ 33, 43 (May 14, 1992). 
6 The A/appal case is now awaiting in bane decision from the Federal Circuit. See [CITE TO 
PTCJ]. 
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statute should be modified if necessary to give the Board decisional 
independence from the Commissioner. 
This Commentary is directed primarily to this latter point. In 
summary, it concludes that the Commissioner, and not the Board, is 
inherently better suited to determine policy in the patent area. What-
ever administrative lawmaking authority exists in the patent area should 
therefore reside in the Commissioner. Given this conclusion, there is 
little or nothing to gain from placing the adjudicatory powers of the 
Board outside the Commissioner's supervision. Indeed, such a change 
would likely have negative effects. The most appropriate course is 
th~re.fore to continue the Board's present subservience to the Com-
mISSIoner. 
I. SEPARATING THE BOARD's ADJUDICATORY FUNCTION FROM THE 
COMMISSIONER 
The three major, traditional functions of administrative agencies 
are rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication.7 The PTO has no 
enforcement powers with regard to matters of patent infringement. 8 
Rather, by determining whether a patent should be allowed to issue 
the PTO functions in the United States patent system mainly as the 
decisionmaker in an initial licensing proceeding-an issued patent is 
essentially a revocable license to maintain a private action for patent 
infringement. 9 Thus, in the process of conducting ex parte exami-
nation of patent applications the Examining Corps essentially per-
forms the combined functions of an adjudicationlO and enforcementll 
of this initial licensing transaction. The Board performs an appellate 
adjudication within the agency. 
It is clearly possible to separate the Board's appellate adjudi-
catory function from the rest of the PTO's functions. Taking another 
set of federal administrative entities as a closely related example, 
Congress has empowered the Secretary of Labor, via the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA"), to investigate 
7 E.g., Donovan v. Amorello, 761 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); see generally, 
e.g., Asimow, The Curtain Falls: Separation of Function in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 
81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981). 
8 See Moy, Judicia~ Deference to the PTO's Interpretations of the Patent Law, 74 JPTOS 406, 
nn.115-17 (1992). 
9 Id. at nn. 139-40. 
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (defining the decision whether to grant an initial license as an adjudi-
cation). 
11 Cf., e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (describing "three hat" function 
of Social Security Administration AUs to include both enforcement and adjudication). 
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violations of workplace regulations and bring enforcement proceed-
ings against violators. Congress created another agency, however, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the "Reg-
ulatory Commission"), to adjudicate disputes over OSHA's enforce-
ment efforts.12 Thus, there is no legal obstacle to Congress giving 
the Board decisional independence from the Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks. 13 
II. SEPARATION OF FUNCTION AS A CURE 
Every legal rule, whether defined by adjudication or legislation, 
must be interpreted before it can be applied to a given fact pattern. 
Language is not self-defining; even if it were, no court or legislature 
could hope to provide a set of legal rules so exhaustive as to cover 
every possible factual situation~ This task of making law within a 
framework of set controlling rules inevitably falls on the administra-
tive agencies that operate in a given area. Agencies see a much larger 
set of fact patterns than come before the courts or are considered by 
Congress. Agencies, moreover, are on the "front line" of the law. 
New fact patterns, and therefore new lawmaking demands, typically 
come before the agency first and are presented to the reviewing courts 
only after the agency has acted. For reasons such these, scholars in 
the field of administrative law commonly accept that agencies must 
make new law to some extent. 
This issue is at the heart of the dispute over the Board's rela-
tionship to the Commissioner. The disputes in Alappat and Akamatsu 
12 See generally e.g., Martin v. Occ. Safety § Health Rev. Comm'n., __ U.S. __ , 
111 S.Ct. 1171 (1991); Donovan v. AmoreI/o, 761 F.2d 61 and authorities cited therein. 
13 The analogy between the Regulatory Commission and an independent Board may also shed 
some light on the issue whether the Board is already independent of the Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks under the present statute. Congress created the Regulatory Commission as an 
administrative entity entirely separate from the Secretary. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.Ct. at 1174; 
see generally Johnson, The Split Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions From the OSHA and 
MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987). The legislative history, moreover, shows a 
clear Congressional desire to insulate the Regulatory Commission from the influence of the 
Secretary. See, e.g., the authorities discussed in Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.Ct. at 1177·78. Section 
7 of Title 35, U.S.c., and its legislative history, in contrast, appear to display neither of these 
qualities. Had it desired to give the Board independence, for example, Congress could have easily 
employed language similar to that in Article 23 of the European Patent Convention. ("In their 
decisions the members of the Boards shall not be bound by any instructions and shall comply 
only with the provisions of this Convention.") The absence of any express indication argues that 
Congress did not intend for the present Board to have decisional independence from the Com-
missioner of Patents and Trademarks. Indeed, it is quite common in other Federal agencies for 
AUs to be under the control of the agency head. See generally, PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 9.3.6 (2d cd. 1992). 
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do not center on whether the original panel of the Board applied 
undisputed law to the facts correctly. Instead, the dispute is almost 
entirely on whether the original panels in those cases adopted the 
correct legal ruleY Clearly, then, the current dispute is whether the 
Commissioner or the Board will have the lawmaking authority that 
exists at the agency level. 15 
The difficulty is that merely separating the Board's adjudicatory 
function from the Commissioner does not settle this question. The 
Board could potentially function to limit the Commissioner's law-
making authority16 in at least two ways. First, it could be given the 
power to strike down interpretive rulings of the Commissioner that 
it finds either unreasonable or contrary to binding authority Y In this 
way the Board could place limits on the Commissioner's lawmaking 
powers that would be directly analogous to those the courts impose 
when reviewing agency action.18 Second, the Board could be given 
the broad power to impose its own view of the proper interpretive 
legal rule on the Commissioner. That is, the Board's view of the law 
could control even in those situations where the Commissioner's 
interpretation is both reasonable and consistent with the underlying 
authority that is being interpreted. Presumably, the Commissioner's 
interpretive actions are usually both reasonable and consistent with 
authority. As a result, the first potential power of the Board is much 
less significant than the second. 
Merely removing the Board from the Commissioner's supervi-
sion does not necessarily confer on it this second type of power. It 
is entirely possible for adjudicatory power to rest in one administra-
tive entity and interpretive rulemaking authority to rest in another. 
The Regulatory Commission in Martin, for example, despite being 
14 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Alappat, slip op. at 25. 
15 See generally, PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 
9.3.6 (2d ed. 1992). 
16 This Commentary assumes that the Commissioner has interpretive, but not substantive law 
making authority. See Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 
JPTOS 257, nn.46-60 (1992). As a consequence, it does not consider the impact of any substantive 
law-making authority that the Commissioner may have. It should be noted, however, that this 
view of the Commissioner's substantive law-making authority is not held universally. See, e.g., 
AIPLA, Independence of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 2 FED. OR. BAR J. 
215, 219 n.9 (1992). 
17 Cf. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.O. at 1178 (noting power of the Regulatory Commission to 
"assure" the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the underlying authority). 
18 E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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separate from the Secretary of Labor and OSHA,19 is nonetheless 
bound to apply the interpretive rules promulgated by the Secretary. 20 
Simply separating the Board and its adjudicatory function from 
the Commissioner, therefore, will not get at the heart of the current 
debate. Instead, this can be settled reliably only by asking the ques-
tion: "Which actor, the Commissioner or the Board, should have the 
power to interpret the law of patents at the agency level?" 
III. THE RELATIVE LAWMAKING EXPERTISE OF THE BOARD AND 
THE COMMISSIONER 
The position of the two actors within the structure of the patent 
system indicates that the Commissioner, and not the Board, is likely 
to possess the better lawmaking abilities. The Board sees, essentially, 
only ex parte proceedings on whether to issue patents and inter partes 
proceedings on contested interferences. In both cases its perspective 
is that of an adjudicator only. III addition, particularly with the first 
class of cases, the Board sees only those application proceedings 
whose initial adjudicatory decisions are appealed-certainly a small 
fraction of the application proceedings that actually occur. 
The Commissioner, in contrast, has experience with a much 
wider range of activities. Through his supervision of the examining 
corps, he comes into contact with application proceedings. These are 
greater in number and arguably afford him a greater perspective than 
do the few cases that come before the Board. In addition, however, 
the Commissioner is exposed to a wide range of activities that find 
no parallel in the Board's functions. The Commissioner, for example, 
participates actively before Congress with regard to legislative matters 
that touch upon the patent system. He is the primary official of the 
United States in foreign negotiations that involve patent matters. He 
participates in legal proceedings outside the PTO that involve PTO 
matters, both before the Federal Circuit in in re appeals, and in certain 
district court proceedings as either a party or an amicus.21 Finally, 
he has a much greater range of contacts with the patent bar and users 
of the patent system than does the Board. 
19 Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-59, 666, with 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 (b)(3). 
20 Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.C!. 1171. Cf. also, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 
33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (AU bound by declared agency policy). 
21 E.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Patlex Corp. 
v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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These different qualities of the Board and the Commissioner are 
inherent in their statutorily defined roles. Together, they indicate that 
the Commissioner should be given primary interpretive lawmaking 
power at the administrative level. He is the actor with the wider range 
of experience. As a result, he should be better able in general to 
balance the competing policies that are involved when selecting be-
tween competing legal rules. 22 
IV. THE LAWMAKING FORMS OF THE BOARD AND THE 
COMMISSIONER 
In addition to these reasons of substantive administrative law, 
there are purely mechanical reasons to prefer that interpretive law-
making power reside in the Commissioner instead of the Board. The 
Commissioner typically announces his interpretive decisions either as 
formal rules in Title 37, C.F.R., or informal statements published in 
the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINI~G PROCEDURE or the OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE. Each of these formats presents the rulings in a codified, 
definite, plainly visible form. The Board, in contrast, reaches its 
interpretive rulings via adjudication. Legal scholars have explored 
with vigor the task of discerning legal rules from a body of adjudi-
cated decisions. The task is notoriously difficult. The dividing line 
between holding and dicta, for example, is uncertain. The holdings 
in different cases inevitably conflict and must be reconciled. 
For these reasons, the Commissioner is likely to be more effi-
cient than the Board in defining patent law at the agency level. This 
is particularly true when one considers that many of the persons who 
use the PTO's interpretive rulings routinely have no legal training.23 
It may be particularly inefficient to communi~ate the PTO's inter-
pretations of the law of patents to these persons by adjudication. 
The choice of rulemaking v. adjudication also presents other 
important reasons to favor the Commissioner. If given law-making 
authority, the Board, which is a 33-member body that sits in 3-
member panels, will inevitably find it difficult to apply consistent 
legal rules to persons who are similarly situated. Rulemaking by the 
Commissioner is thus more likely to be just. The notice-and-comment 
procedure, which the Commissioner can use but the Board cannot, 
22 Cf. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.C!. at 1176·79. 
23 Roughly half of the patent examiners in the PTO do not have law degrees. In addition, the 
PTO rules of practice permit persons with technical training, but no training in law, to represent 
patent applicants before the PTO. 
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is moreover capable of generating a record that far surpasses anything 
the Board is reasonably likely to have at its disposal. Perhaps most 
importantly, rulemaking will centralize accountability for policy de-
cisions in this area in the person of the Commissioner. Accountability 
could be a severe problem with an entity as large and diffuse as the 
Board. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The clearly better result is to place interpretive lawmaking au-
thority, at the agency level, in the Commissioner and not the Board. 
The Commissioner knows better the competing policies that drive the 
formation of the law in this area. As a direct result, his lawmaking 
decisions are likely to be of a higher quality than those of the Board. 
In addition, the format in which the Commissioner states his in-
terpretive rulings carries with it inherent advantages over the adju-
dicative format that the Board would use. 
Given this conclusion, there is little or no point to removing the 
Board from the Commissioner's supervision. A separate Board that 
is nonetheless bound to apply the Commissioner's rulings will have 
few freedoms in addition to those the Board now possesses. An in-
dependent Board could be given the power to strike down an indi-
vidual interpretive ruling of the Commissioner as either unreasonable 
or contrary to higher, binding authority. In reality, however, such 
occurrences are rare, and in the event that they do occur the Federal 
Circuit's review of the Commissioner's rulings is likely to be an 
adequate safeguard. In the much larger class of cases the Board and 
the Commissioner will simply disagree over which of two competing, 
reasonable interpretations is preferable. The advantage of relying on 
the Commissioner's judgments in this latter class of cases is plain. 
Creating an independent Board simply to address the small number 
of cases in the former class would probably be unwise. 
